"The fact is this: post-World Cup, they can not stay in games in the second half. That has to be concerning for Jurgen Klinsmann and his staff."-- Taylor Twellman
Taylor's right. Friday's 2-1 loss to Colombia marked yet another second-half collapse, the USMNT's third in four post-World Cup games.
In fact, this marks the first time in the past 20 years that the US have lost or settled for a draw in three straight games after allowing a goal in the 85th minute or later.
But the starting point for that timeline is earlier than Twellman gave it credit for. You can go back to the 2-1 loss to Belgium, when the Yanks were outscored 2-1 in extra time. Or you could go back one game before that, when they gave up a second-half goal to Germany for a 1-0 loss.
Over those six games - four friendlies and two World Cup games - the US have taken a desired result into the break six times. They've finished the game with a desired result just once.
Or you could go back even further, to the start of June. That'll give you a 10-game sample size, which is enough to be statistically significant.
So here you go: Over the last 10 games, Klinsmann's team have conceded nine goals in the 80th minute or beyond.
His teams run on fumes. Read Matt Besler's comments in THIS article for an idea as to why.
Here are a few other things I took from today's loss:
1. Everything through Beckerman
I'll go to my grave believing Kyle Beckerman was our best player in this summer's World Cup, and he reprised that role again in this one. The Colombian play-by-play guys were especially impressed:
Beckerman was legitimately great in the first half of this one, controlling the shape of the game when the US were in possession. His usage rate (percentage of total US pass attempts that were his) was a very high 14.1 percent. That's not quite as high as his number for RSL - just a smidgen under 15 percent - but is much better than his Hexagonal (12.25 percent) or World Cup (10.64 percent) shares of the ball.
What's that mean? Mostly that Klinsmann has recognized the importance of "shape" in his team's attack, and that Beckerman does the best job of allowing his guys to keep it. If the goal is to get the ball quickly and accurately to the likes of Jozy Altidore, Alejandro Bedoya, Mix Diskerud or the very impressive Rubio Rubin, Beckerman needs to be on the field.
He can also do the job when he pushes into the attack himself, as his left-footed cross to Rubin in the first half indicated. Got to wonder how this one would have turned out had the kid buried that chance.
The worry here is that Beckerman is approaching 33 and is something close to inimitable in the US pool. Michael Bradley and Jermaine Jones play the back point of the diamond in a very different way, and while Wil Trapp is a promising youngster... I mean, we all watched what the Revs just did to the Crew, right?
Beckerman - once forgotten and always doubted - suddenly looks like the key man for at least the next 6-to-8 months. Without him, this team will both attack and defend significantly worse than they have.
2. Pretty re-debut
The story of "What Might Have Been" with Lee Nguyen is becoming irresistable, because this is just beyond lovely:
This was Nguyen's first US appearance in over seven years, and he looked 100 percent up to it both in terms of the speed and the intensity of the game. He was quick to close down defensively, and the run to start this play was as sublime as the touch on that pass.
That's the difference that Nguyen brings to the No. 10 role as opposed to Diskerud (who had a clunker) or Bradley (who's not a No. 10). He is, first and foremost, an attacker, and when space opens up in front of him, he will take it.
Whether it's him or one of the others playing that position - assuming Klinsmann sticks with this diamond, or 4-1-3-2 - that's something that has to be done when the US push numbers forward. Overloading the flanks isn't just a strategy to create chances from the flanks; it's a way of pulling central defenders out of position and creating gaps for guys like Nguyen to exploit by either bursting through the lines or setting camp in between them.
More of this, please.
3. Hoof & Hope
Better than one in every six passes the US attempted in this one was a long-ball, as they clocked in at 18.6 percent (for comparison, Colombia clocked in at 12.6 percent). And for the vast, vast majority, these were not measured, tactical long-balls, but "kick and hope" stuff of the variety the US had, once upon a time, left back in the 1990s.
The distribution chart from Jones and John Anthony Brooks looks like something from a slasher film:
I don't really blame the players - one isn't getting minutes for his club team, while the other is learning a new position. There will be growing pains.
But there's also the simple question of how the team is set up, and if this is the best way for them to play winning soccer. Certainly, "long-ball to Jozy Altidore" is a proven loser of a strategy at both the club and international level.
These are the same issues that have plagued Klinsmann's teams for the last three years, and putting Jones - king of the hero ball - in central defense has only exacerbated those tendencies over the last 180 minutes.
Growing pains at the start of a new cycle are common, and there are still seven months before the games really mean something. But "growing pains" implies growth, in results as well as process.
Neither has been on display thus far, and the clock is ticking.
